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The project: Unbound DNS
From the Unbound website: “Unbound is a validating, recursive, caching DNS resolver. It is designed to be fast and lean and incorporates modern features based on open standards.To help increase online privacy, Unbound supports DNS-over-TLS which allows clients to encrypt their communication. In addition, it supports various modern standards that limit the amount of data exchanged with authoritative servers. These standards do not only improve privacy but also help making the DNS more robust. The most important are Query Name Minimization, the Aggressive Use of DNSSEC-Validated Cache and support for authority zones, which can be used to load a copy of the root zone.Unbound runs on FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, MacOS, Linux and Microsoft Windows, with packages available for most platforms. It is included in the base-system of FreeBSD and OpenBSD and in the standard repositories of most Linux distributions. Installation and configuration is designed to be easy. Setting up a resolver for your machine or network can be done with only a few lines of configuration.It is free, open source software under the BSD license. The guiding principles for our product development roadmap are first and foremost the security and privacy of the user. In addition, all functionality must be backed by well established open standards. We continually improve the functionality of Unbound for all of our users…”
The Scope
The audit was designed to locate bugs and weaknesses in design that impact the security of servers running Unbound DNS. A combination of manual code auditing, dynamic analysis using a custom fuzzing harness, and
static analysis was used to perform the audit.
The Broad Strokes
Both the audit team and the Unbound team are happy with the results as they are shown. This project led to a total of 48 changes in unbound that either improve security or fix minor issues that could lead to future security problems as the application grows and evolves over time. The consensus is that Unbound has greatly benefited from the work and that the users and applications that depend on it are now safer than they were prior to our work. A patch will be released tomorrow, December 12th 2019. A release candidate patch addressing all outstanding issues is here: https://nlnetlabs.nl/pipermail/unbound-users/2019-December/011930.html all other outstanding issues were corrected in versions 1.9.4 and 1.9.5.
FIXED = A patch was applied that corrects this issue.
SOLVED = Clarification given by the Unbound team indicates that the issue does not need patching for other reasons.
DISPUTED = The Unbound team disagrees with the assessment.
If an issue does not have a status, it is because the issue is still being discussed between the teams. It does not indicate a dispute, only that OSTIF does not know the current status. The status of the issues will be updated here as we learn more about them.
The Detailed Audit Results
One Critical, Five High, and Five Medium severity issues were found, with an additional 39 issues that were rated as low or informational severity.
CVE-2019-18934 – CRITICAL – Shell Injection in IPSECMOD
FIXED in commit 09845779d5f2c96e3064ff398cad65c08357cfbf
When using the IPSECMOD module, a malicious DNS response from a client can inject commands into the host machine.
CVE-2019-16866 – HIGH – Uninitialized Memory in worker_handle_request()
FIXED in commit b60c4a472c856f0a98120b7259e991b3a6507eb5
A use-after-free issue in worker_handle_request() can lead to remote code execution or denial of service.
HIGH – Config Injection in create_unbound_ad_servers.sh
FIXED in commit f887552763477a606a9608b0f6b498685e0f6587
The bash script in contrib/create_unbound_ad_servers.sh does not properly sanitize the retrieved data before it is outputted into a configuration file. This allows to modify the configuration by having several statements on a single line. Since the input is retrieved via unencrypted, unauthenticated HTTP an attacker on the wire might be able to abuse this issue.
HIGH – Integer Overflow in Regional Allocator
FIXED in commit 226298bbd36f1f0fd9608e98c2ae85988b7bbdb8
When the regional allocator in util/regional.c is used to allocate memory via regional_alloc() integer overflows can happen. If size is big enough the first call to malloc() will have a parameter that is
smaller than expected. Furthermore the macro ALIGN_UP could overflow causing r->available to point at a bad memory location.
HIGH – Integer Overflow in sldns_str2wire_dname_buf_origin()
FIXED in commit a3545867fcdec50307c776ce0af28d07046a52dd
The function sldns_str2wire_dname_buf_origin() in sldns/str2wire.c converts a string to dname wireformat, concatenating with origin when the domain name is relative. Several checks are performed to avoid a buffer overflow when writing the result into buf. Nevertheless, when dlen + origin_len is bigger than sizeof(size_t), the calculation will wrap around, resulting in the value of the addition being smaller than the operands. When this happens, the checks might be bypassed and could lead to memmove() writing out of bounds. An out of bounds write produces unexpected results and can usually be abused by an attacker to gain remote code execution.
HIGH – Out of Bounds Write in sldns_bget_token_par()
FIXED in commit fa23ee8f31ba9a018c720ea822faaee639dc7a9c
The function sldns_bget_token_par() in sldns/parse.c returns a token from a buffer. While parsing the input buffer, char by char, certain inputs will result in a write and increment to the token buffer without checking boundary limits. A specially crafted input could repeatedly trigger this unbounded write and eventually perform a write outside of token ’s bounds. An out of bounds write produces unexpected results and can usually be abused by an attacker to gain remote code execution.
MEDIUM – Assert Causing DoS in synth_cname()
FIXED in commit f5e06689d193619c57c33270c83f5e40781a261d
It is possible to trigger an log_assert() in synth_cname() by sending invalid packets to the server. This issue should not be fixed by disabling asserts, as this raises an additional possible integer underflow issue. If asserts are disabled during compilation, this might lead to an out of bounds write in dname_pkt_copy() since the computation alias+(qnamelen-dname_rrset->dname_len) might become negative due to an underflow.
MEDIUM – Assert Causing DoS in dname_pkt_copy()
FIXED in commit d2eb78e871153f22332d30c6647f3815148f21e5
It is possible to trigger an assert() in dname_pkt_copy() by sending invalid packets to the server.
MEDIUM – Integer Overflows in Size Calculations
FIXED in commit 02080f6b180232f43b77f403d0c038e9360a460f
In different files and functions sizes are calculated that are later passed on to different allocation functions such as malloc(). Several of these cases are not protected against integer overflows.
MEDIUM – Insufficient Handling of Compressed Names in dname_pkt_copy()
FIXED in commit 2d444a5037acff6024630b88092d9188f2f5d8fe
In dname_pkt_copy() an infinite loop can be caused by the input data \xC0\x00. This will cause the LABEL_IS_PTR macro to return true and set lablen to 0, causing the checking to start at the beginning of the input again. Additionally, the log_assert() can be triggered quite easily, leading to another DoS.
MEDIUM – Out of Bound Write Compressed Names in rdata_copy()
FIXED in commit 6c3a0b54ed8ace93d5b5ca7b8078dc87e75cd640
In rdata_copy(), if the len parameter becomes bigger than the size of the packet (pkt_len ), the memmove() is performed before the check in log_assert(). It seems that, due to the fact that packets are first parsed by other functions that check for
unbounded pointers, this might not be exploitable.
This is a short synopsis of the full report below which contains PoC examples, code snippets, and an additional 70 pages of analysis and issues that were identified to improve code quality and harden Unbound further against attack.
The Full Audit Report for Unbound DNS by X41 D-Sec
X41-Unbound-Security-Audit-2019-Final-Report
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