CubeFS Security Audit

In collaboration with the CubeFS project maintainers, The Linux Foundation and the Open Source Technology Improvement Fund

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Executive summary

In the fall of 2023, Ada Logics conducted a security audit of CubeFS in a coordinated collaboration between Ada Logics, CubeFS, OSTIF and the CNCF. The CNCF funded the work. The security audit was a holistic security audit with the following goals:

1. Assess and formalize a threat model for CubeFS highlighting entrypoints, risks and at-risk components.
2. Review the CubeFS codebase for security vulnerabilities of any severity.
3. Review CubeFS’s supply-chain maturity against SLSA.

To formalize the threat model, Ada Logics relied on three sources of information: 1) CubeFS’s official documentation, 2) the CubeFS source tree and 3) feedback from the CubeFS maintainers. The manual review was performed against the threat model to allow the auditors to consider trust levels and threat actors as they were reviewing the code.

The report contains all issues found from both the threat modelling and manual code audit exercises. Five of these issues were exploitable by threat actors identified during the threat modelling, and these issues were assigned the following CVE’s:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>CVE</th>
<th>CVE severity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authenticated users can crash the CubeFS servers with maliciously crafted requests</td>
<td>CVE-2023-46738</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing attack can leak user passwords</td>
<td>CVE-2023-46739</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecure random string generator used for sensitive data</td>
<td>CVE-2023-46740</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CubeFS leaks magic secret key when starting Blobstore access service</td>
<td>CVE-2023-46741</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CubeFS leaks users key in logs</td>
<td>CVE-2023-46742</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ada Logics disclosed these findings responsibly to CubeFS through CubeFS’s public Github Security Advisory disclosure channels. The CubeFS security response team responded to the disclosures with fixes in a timely manner and before the audit had been completed.

The SLSA review found that CubeFS scores low because it does not include provenance for releases. Ada Logics included practical steps for achieving SLSA Level 3 compliance.
Strategic recommendations

In this section, we include our strategic recommendations for CubeFS to maintain a secure project moving forward. Several points in this section are reflected in "Found Issues" or other parts of the report, whereas some are only included here.

Supply-Chain Security
CubeFS has undoubtedly included supply-chain security in its ongoing work. For example, CubeFS has adopted Scorecard, which considers several different aspects of supply-chain security risks in an automated manner. Nonetheless, Supply-chain Security is an area where CubeFS can improve its ongoing work. The audit found that releases are not signed and do not include provenance, which makes consumers vulnerable to known supply-chain risks. We have included practical steps to take to add this to releases. While CubeFS has integrated the Scorecard Github Action, CubeFS currently scores a 6.5 Scorecard score, which leaves room for improvement. Open and closed-sourced software ecosystems are seeing an increase in supply-chain attacks and their sophistication, with major recent attacks having had their first compromise in the software development lifecycle rather than after deployment.

Static analysis
CubeFS uses automated SAST in its development pipeline however limited to only CodeQL for security tooling. During the audit, Ada Logics tested CubeFS with other SAST tools, which found true positives in the CubeFS code base. We recommend adding the GoSec and Semgrep tools as well and add `ignore` directives for false positives.

Security-relevant documentation
CubeFS has good documentation but lacks a dedicated security-best-practices section to help users deploy a security-hardened CubeFS instance. We recommend adding and maintaining this to ensure users can consume CubeFS in a secure manner and avoid security issues arising from misconfiguration.

During the security audit, the CubeFS team added a security-best-practices section to the official CubeFS documentation which is available here:
https://cubefs.io/docs/master/maintenance/security_practice.html
## Project Scope

The following Ada Logics auditors carried out the audit and prepared the report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following CubeFS team members were part of the audit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following OSTIF members were part of the audit.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Threat model

In this part, we look at CubeFS’s threat model. We have used open-source materials to formalize the threat model including mainly from documentation produced by the CubeFS ecosystem, recorded talks, presentations and third-party documentation.

CubeFS is a cloud-native data storage infrastructure often used on top of databases, machine-learning platforms and applications deployed on top of Kubernetes. It supports multiple access protocols like S3, POSIX and HDFS with flexibility for consumers using multiple protocols in the same deployment.

CubeFS has four main components: 1) A metadata subsystem, 2) a data subsystem, 3) a resource management node also called “Master” and 4) an Object Subsystem. Below, we enumerate the components.

Metadata subsystem

The Metadata subsystem runs the MetaNode which stores all file metadata in the cluster. In Kubernetes, this is deployed as a DaemonSet K8s resource.

Data subsystem

The data subsystem is known internally in CubeFS as DataNode and handles the actual storing of file data. It mounts a large amount of disk space to store file data. When using CubeFS with Kubernetes, DataNode is deployed as a DaemonSet.

Resource management

The resource management component is called Master and is responsible for managing resources and maintaining the metadata of the whole cluster. When deploying CubeFS on Kubernetes, the Master Node is deployed as a StatefulSet K8s resource.

Object Subsystem

This component runs ObjectNodes and acts as an interface between different protocols - HDFS, POSIX and S3 - such that CubeFS works as the underlying data store, and the user can operate CubeFS by way of either or several of these protocols. The Object Subsystem is also called the Object Gateway internally in the CubeFS ecosystem.

In addition to the four core components, CubeFS implements an AuthNode which handles authentication and authorization in a CubeFS deployment.

CubeFS is meant to be deployed in such a manner that it is available to users of varying permission levels. This means that at a high level, CubeFS must be resistant to malicious cluster users who have been granted access. For example, if an organization grants access to an employee who gets convinced by a competitor to steal or corrupt data, the CubeFS devops team must know the impact this employee has for risk mitigation and impact remediation purposes. User permissions in CubeFS should start at the lowest and increase with the permissions that CubeFS admins intend to add to the user.

There are at least two security-relevant implications for CubeFS’s architectural and permission design:
1. Users should not be able to achieve permissions they have not been granted. A permission should not imply another permission, whether intended or not. At this level, we are considering defined permissions that are not assigned to a user. This part of CubeFS’s security model distinguishes between privileges at a granular level.

2. The second implication is the distinction between root and non-root permissions. CubeFS should accept a full cluster deletion by the cluster admin; it is not a security breach if the cluster admin or CubeFS admin can take down the entire cluster or cause any other harm to any part of CubeFS. There is an implied list of non-permitted actions that users should not be allowed to perform. These are general security risks that pertain to other software applications, such as Denial-of-Service attacks, stealing data, remote code execution, corruption of data and other general threats.

Most commonly, CubeFS is not exposed directly to the internet but will be available to services inside the cluster to which it is deployed. A CubeFS deployment will have multiple client nodes that include a client container, which is intended to communicate with the remaining CubeFS components. Communication between components happens via HTTP(S); Each component exposes a web server to the cluster. As such, threats are likely to come from users who already have a position in the cluster. This position can be through a legitimate use case - a user that should have access and has been granted so by the CubeFS admin, or it could be through a threat actor who has already escalated privileges and who seeks to further advance their position inside the cluster. In the former scenario, we have covered the expectations above, which we can sum up as such: If a legitimate user turns malicious, the CubeFS admin should know what their impact is and should be in control of reducing any permissions that the user has. In other words, what the CubeFS admin expects the user can do represents the user’s privileges precisely. For the latter, CubeFS should reduce the ease with which an attacker can further escalate privileges inside the cluster.
Trust boundaries

In this section, we identify the trust boundaries of a CubeFS deployment. Below, we include a trust-flow diagram of an out-of-the-box CubeFS deployment:

Typically, a CubeFS deployment will be deployed alongside an internet-facing application in the cluster with which users communicate. When traffic enters the cluster, it crosses a trust boundary and flows low to high in the direction from the internet to the cluster. This trust boundary could also exist between the user-facing application and the CubeFS client nodes, depending on the specific use case. The reason for this is that the user-facing application could do its own validation and sanitization. From the user-facing application, traffic flows to the CubeFS client nodes. These authenticate the request before processing it, and the traffic crosses another trust boundary when being authenticated. At this point, trust flows low to high in the direction from the CubeFS client nodes to the authenticator. Trust remains high until CubeFS responds to the user external to the cluster.
Threat actors

A threat actor is an individual or group that intentionally attempts to exploit vulnerabilities, deploy malicious code, or compromise or disrupt a CubeFS deployment, often for financial gain, espionage, or sabotage. A threat actor is the personification of a possible attacker of security issues. Each threat actor has a level of trust tied to them, and matching one or several threat actors with CubeFS’s threat model helps identify the high-level security risk. We identify the following threat actors for CubeFS. A threat actor can assume multiple profiles from the table below; for example, a fully untrusted user can also be a contributor to a 3rd-party library used by CubeFS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Actor</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Level of trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code contributor to CubeFS</td>
<td>Person or group of people that contribute code to CubeFS's upstream repository</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code contributor to CubeFS's 3rd-party dependencies</td>
<td>Person or group of people that contribute code to CubeFS's 3rd-party dependencies</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External users of ingress cluster entrypoints</td>
<td>Users that interact with internet-facing applications in the cluster. The purpose of these entrypoints will for the most part be to enable use of CubeFS.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside actor with position in cluster</td>
<td>A person or group of people with no granted privileges that have escalated privileges by using a weakness in CubeFS, its underlying platform or a 3rd-party dependency.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster user</td>
<td>Cluster users with non-root privileges. These are users of the CubeFS deployment.</td>
<td>Low to high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure contributors</td>
<td>These are users that maintain applications and infrastructure running on the cluster. This threat actor is not a user of CubeFS themselves, but they facilitate access for other users.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster admin</td>
<td>Users with sudo permissions over the cluster and CubeFS.</td>
<td>Full</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SLSA review

ADA Logics carried out a SLSA review of CubeFS. SLSA ([https://github.com/slsa.dev](https://github.com/slsa.dev)) is a framework for assessing the security practices of a given software project with a focus on mitigating supply-chain risk. SLSA emphasises tamper resistance of artifacts as well as ephemerality of the build and release cycle.

SLSA mitigates a series of attack vectors in the software development life cycle (SDLC), all of which have seen real-world examples of successful attacks against open-source and proprietary software.

Below, we include a diagram made by the SLSA illustrating the attack surface of the SDLC.

Each of the red markers demonstrate different areas of possible compromise that could allow attackers to tamper with the artifact that the consumer invokes at the end of the SDLC.

SLSA splits its assessment criteria into 4 increasingly demanding levels. The higher the level of compliance, the higher tamper-resistance the project ensures its consumers.

An essential part of ensuring tamper resistance is to include a verifiable provenance statement with releases. SLSA provides a framework for creating this automatically when building release artifacts ([https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator)) which we recommend CubeFS adopts. Building artifacts by way of the slsa-github-generator will produce SLSA level 3 compliant provenance. CubeFS can adopt the slsa-github-generator by adding a Github workflow that invokes the SLSA builder.

Complying with SLSA level 3 reflects a high standard of supply-chain mitigation, and CubeFS consumers should not be discouraged from a low level of compliance. We recommend that the CubeFS community tracks ongoing work for adopting the slsa-github-generator project and working on this in the open. It is far from all open-source projects that have achieved level 3 compliance at this part of SLSA open-source lifetime.

CubeFS currently is at Level 0 by the SLSA specification.
# Issues found

Ada Logics found 12 issues during the audit. The list includes all issues found by way of manual auditing and fuzzing. Ada Logics uses a scoring system that considers impact and ease of exploitation. This is different from the CVSS scoring system, and there may be discrepancies between the severity assigned by Ada Logics and the severity resulting from a CVSS calculation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Severity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Authenticated users can crash the CubeFS servers with maliciously crafted requests</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CubeFS leaks magic secret key when starting Blobstore access service</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CubeFS leaks users key in logs</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Insecure cryptographic primitive used for sensitive data</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Insecure random string generator used for sensitive data</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lack of security-best-practices documentation</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Possible deadlocks</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Possible nil-dereference from unmarshalling double pointer</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Potential Slowloris attacks</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Releases are not signed</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Security Disclosure Email Does Not Work</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Timing attack can leak user passwords</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Authenticated users can crash the CubeFS servers with maliciously crafted requests

**Severity:** Moderate  
**Status:** Fixed  
**Id:** ADA-CUBEFS-NKbh4NJK  
**Component:** ObjectNode

The root cause is that when CubeFS reads the body of incoming requests, it reads it entirely into memory and without an upper boundary. As such, an attacker can craft an HTTP that contains a large body and exhausts memory of the machine, which results in crashing the server.

**Details**

The issue exists across multiple CubeFS components. We have not made an exhaustive list and will follow up with that. For now, we exemplify the issue with the `deleteObjectsHandler` of the `objectnode` component. This handler reads the body of the incoming request entirely into memory on line 561 below:

```go
func (o *ObjectNode) deleteObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    var 
        err error
        errorCode *ErrorCode
    
    defer func() {
        o.errorResponse(w, r, err, errorCode)
    }()

    var param = ParseRequestParam(r)
    if param.Bucket() == "" {
        errorCode = InvalidBucketName
        return
    }

    var vol *Volume
    if vol, err = o.getVol(param.Bucket()); err != nil {
        log.LogErrorf("deleteObjectsHandler: load volume fail: requestID(%v) volume(%v) err(%v)", 
            GetRequestID(r), param.Bucket(), err)
        return
    }

    requestMD5 := r.Header.Get(ContentMD5)
    if requestMD5 == "" {
        errorCode = MissingContentMD5
        return
    }

    bytes []byte
    bytes, err = ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body)
    if err != nil {
        log.LogErrorf("deleteObjectsHandler: read request body fail: requestID(%v) volume(%v) err(%v)", 
            GetRequestID(r), param.Bucket(), err)
        errorCode = UnexpectedContent
        return
    }
```

In this case, a user does not require permission to delete objects since the ACL check is done after reading the request body.

**PoC**
We include two programs to reproduce this issue. Warning: save all work before running this PoC, including work in browser tabs.

The first program is a server that represents the `deleteObjectsHandler`. We have stripped unrelated parts of the function body that the HTTP request can easily pass legitimately. Start up this server by creating the following go module and run it with `go run main.go`:

```go
package main
import (
    "fmt"
    "io/ioutil"
    "net/http"
)
func main() {
    http.HandleFunc("/deleteObjects", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        // Here CubeFS gets the params. We skip that since an authenticated user can get past that.
        // Here CubeFS gets the volume. The user can pass a Bucket identifier that will not return an error to get past that.
        // Here CubeFS gets the requestMD5. The user can include any value in the header to get past that.
        // At this point, the handler invokes the vulnerable line
        fmt.Println("Got request")
        _, err := ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body)
        if err != nil {
            return
        }
        fmt.Println("Finished reading body")
    })
    fmt.Printf("Starting server at port 8080\n")
    if err := http.ListenAndServe(":8080", nil); err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
}
```

You should see `Starting server at port 8080` in the terminal when starting this program.

The next program is the client. This program represents the malicious user who crafts a request with a large body and sends it to the server. Depending on the system used when running this program, it may be necessary to reduce or increase the size of the body. Create the following `main.go` in another module and run it with `go run main.go`:

```go
package main
import (
    "io"
    "strings"
    "net/http"
)
func main() {
    req := maliciousRequest()
    _, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
    if err != nil{
        panic(err)
    }
}

func maliciousRequest() *http.Request {
    s := strings.Repeat("malicious string", 100000000)
    r1 := strings.NewReader(s)
    r2 := strings.NewReader(s)
    r3 := strings.NewReader(s)
    r4 := strings.NewReader(s)
    r5 := strings.NewReader(s)
    r6 := strings.NewReader(s)
    r7 := strings.NewReader(s)
    r8 := strings.NewReader(s)
    r := io.MultiReader(r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8)
    return
}
```
This request should exhaust memory temporarily and then crash the server.

**Impact**

All CubeFS users are impacted by this issue.
CubeFS leaks magic secret key when starting Blobstore access service

Severity: Moderate
Status: Fixed
Id: ADA-CUBEFS-MNJHBrv3
Component: BlobStore

CubeFS leaks secret configuration keys during initialization of the blobstore access service controller, more specifically here:

```go
76 func initWithRegionMagic(regionMagic string) {
77 if regionMagic == "" {
78 log.Warn("no region magic setting, using default secret keys for checksum")
    return
80 }
81 
82 log.Info("using magic secret keys for checksum with:", regionMagic)
83 b := sha1.Sum([]byte(regionMagic))
84 initTokenSecret(b[:8])
85 initLocationSecret(b[:8])
86 }
```

Users with access to the logs can retrieve the secret key and escalate privileges to carry out operations on blobs that they otherwise don’t have the necessary permissions for. For example, a threat actor who has successfully retrieved a magic secret key from the logs can delete blobs from the blob store by validating their requests in this step:

```go
546 func (s *Service) DeleteBlob(c *rpc.Context) {
547     args := new(access.DeleteBlobArgs)
548     if err := c.ParseArgs(args); err != nil {
549         c/respondError(err)
550         return
551     }
552     
553     ctx := c.Request.Context()
554     span := trace.SpanFromContextSafe(ctx)
555     span.Debugf("accept /deleteblob request args:%+v", args)
556     if !args.IsValid() {
557         c/respondError(errcode.ErrIllegalArguments)
558         return
559     }
560     
561     valid := false
562     for _, secretKey := range tokenSecretKeys {
563         token := uptoken.DecodeToken(args.Token)
564         if token.IsValid(args.ClusterID, args.Vid, args.BlobID, uint32(args.Size), secretKey[:]) {
565             valid = true
566             break
567         }
568     }
569     
570 }
```

To exploit this security issue, the attacker needs to have privileges to read the logs. They could have obtained these privileges legitimately, or they could have obtained them by already having escalated privileges.
CubeFS leaks users key in logs

Severity: Moderate
Status: Fixed
Id: ADA-CUBEFS-vc34CGVVJB
Component: Master

CubeFS leaks secret user keys and access keys in the logs in multiple components. When CubeCS creates new users, it leaks the user’s secret key. This could allow a lower-privileged user with access to the logs to retrieve sensitive information and impersonate other users with higher privileges than themselves.

Details
The vulnerable API that leaks secret keys is `createKey:

```go
43 func (u *User) createKey(param *proto.UserCreateParam) (userInfo *proto.UserInfo, err error) {
44     var (
45         AKUser *proto.AKUser
46         userPolicy *proto.UserPolicy
47         exist bool
48     )
49     if param.ID == "" {
50         err = proto.ErrInvalidUserID
51         return
52     }
53     if !param.Type.Valid() {
54         err = proto.ErrInvalidUserType
55         return
56     }
57     var userID = param.ID
58     var password = param.Password
59     if password == "" {
60         password = DefaultUserPassword
61     }
62     var accessKey = param.AccessKey
63     if accessKey == "" {
64         accessKey = util.RandomString(accessKeyLength, util.Numeric|util.LowerLetter|util.UpperLetter)
65     } else {
66         if !proto.IsValidAK(accessKey) {
67             err = proto.ErrInvalidAccessKey
68             return
69         }
70     }
71     var secretKey = param.SecretKey
72     if secretKey == "" {
74     } else {
75         if !proto.IsValidSK(secretKey) {
76             err = proto.ErrInvalidSecretKey
77             return
78         }
79     }
80     var userType = param.Type
81     var description = param.Description
82     u.userStoreMutex.Lock() defer u.userStoreMutex.Unlock()
83     u.AKStoreMutex.Lock() defer u.AKStoreMutex.Unlock()
84     // check duplicate
85     if _, exist = u.userStore.Load(userID); exist {
86         err = proto.ErrDuplicateUserID
87         return
88     }
89     _, exist = u.AKStore.Load(accessKey) for exist {
```
createKey creates a UserInfo, an access key and a secret key and stores them in the respective stores. If createKey successfully creates all three pieces of information and successfully stores them, it will log the created pieces of information on this line:

```
https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/26da9925a3db98ff9a1e9a12cca2c457f736b831/master/user.go#L109
```

Impact
An attacker who has access to the logs can see the secret key in plain text and impersonate the user. The attacker can either be an internal user with limited privileges to read the log, or it can be an external user who has escalated privileges sufficiently to access the logs.

To find the places where CubeFS logs the users accessKey, we refer to the following grep call:

```
grep -r "log\." . --exclude=*.test.go | grep accessKey. Not all occurrences of this constitute a vulnerability: Only cases of logging after authorization represent a security issue.
```
Insecure cryptographic primitive used for sensitive data

Severity: Moderate
Status: Fixed
Id: ADA-CUBEFS-VGvgh234hb2
Component: Master

Cubefs Master uses an insecure cryptographic primitive for encoding user passwords. Cubefs uses SHA1 to encode the password. Researchers have identified theoretical collision attacks of SHA1 for the first time in 2004 but have only demonstrated it in practice in 2017 (Marc Stevens, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Ange Albertini, and Yarik Markov. “The first collision for full SHA-1”). NIST recommends that existing usage of SHA1 for security-sensitive information should be upgraded to SHA2 or SHA3 (https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/12/nist-retires-sha-1-cryptographic-algorithm). The issue exists in the `encodingPassword` helper:

```
547 func encodingPassword(s string) string {
548     t := sha1.New()
549     io.WriteString(t, s)
550     return hex.EncodeToString(t.Sum(nil))
551 }
```

Cubefs uses this helper when creating a user below on line 100:

```
43 func (u *User) createKey(param *proto.UserCreateParam) (userInfo *proto.UserInfo, err error) {
44     var (
45         AKUser   *proto.AKUser
46         userPolicy *proto.UserPolicy
47         exist bool
48     )
49     if param.ID == "" {
50         err = proto.ErrInvalidUserID
51         return
52     }
53     if !param.Type.Valid() {
54         err = proto.ErrInvalidUserType
55         return
56     }
57     var userID = param.ID
58     var password = param.Password
59     if password == "" {
60         password = DefaultUserPassword
61     }
62     var accessKey = param.AccessKey
63     if accessKey == "" {
64         accessKey = util.RandomString(accessKeyLength, util.Numeric|util.LowerLetter|util.UpperLetter)
65     } else if !proto.IsValidAK(accessKey) {
66         err = proto.ErrInvalidAccessKey
67         return
68     }
69     var secretKey = param.SecretKey
70     if secretKey == "" {
72     } else if !proto.IsValidSK(secretKey) {
73         err = proto.ErrInvalidSecretKey
74         return
75     }
76 }
```
An attacker who can retrieve the database records of users has a lower barrier for getting the actual passwords of users than if CubeFS used a secure primitive such as SHA2 or SHA3. To exploit this weakness, an attacker would already need to escalate privileges or gain access to database records from misconfiguration of a CubeFS deployment. Even so, an attacker has the potential for further escalating privileges by exploiting this weakness depending on the user credentials they can steal.

**Mitigation**

We recommend using a secure primitive for user passwords. This would mitigate risk even if an attacker has access to the encrypted user passwords.
Insecure random string generator used for sensitive data

Severity: Moderate
Status: Fixed
Id: ADA-CUBEFS-BHÆRj2432jk
Component: Master

CubeFS uses an insecure random string generator to generate user-specific, sensitive keys used to authenticate users in a CubeFS deployment. This could allow an attacker to predict and/or guess the generated string and impersonate a user, thereby obtaining higher privileges.

When CubeFS creates new users, it creates a piece of sensitive information for the user called the “accessKey”. To create the accessKey, CubeFS uses an insecure string generator which makes it easy to guess and thereby impersonate the created user. The API that generates access keys is RandomString:

```go
58 func RandomString(length int, seed RandomSeed) string {
59     runs := seed.Runes()
60     result := ""
61     for i := 0; i < length; i++ {
62         rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano())
63         randNumber := rand.Intn(len(runs))
64         result += string(runs[randNumber])
65     }
66     return result
67 }
```

RandomString uses math/rand seeded with UnixNano() to generate the string, which is predictable. math/rand is not suited for sensitive information, as stated in the documentation: https://pkg.go.dev/math/rand#pkg-overview.

CubeFS uses RandomString() to generate user access keys in the following places:

```go
63 var accessKey = param.AccessKey
64 if accessKey == "" {
65     accessKey = util.RandomString(accessKeyLength,
67 } else {

92 _, exist = u.AKStore.Load(accessKey)
93 if exist {
94     accessKey = util.RandomString(accessKeyLength,
96 }
```

```go
72 var secretKey = param.SecretKey
73 if secretKey == "" {
74     secretKey = util.RandomString(secretKeyLength,
76 } else {
```
Impact
An attacker could exploit the predictable random string generator and guess a user's access key to impersonate the user and obtain higher privileges.
Lack of security-best-practices documentation

Severity: Moderate
Status: Fixed
Id: ADA-CUBEFS-vc34CGVJVBJ
Component: CubeFS

CubeFS maintain documentation on how to easily get started with CubeFS, which is positive; however, CubeFS lacks a section or dedicated page on deploying and using CubeFS in a secure, production-ready manner.

We recommend setting up a dedicated page to accommodate this. See the Istio security-best-practices page for reference: https://istio.io/latest/docs/ops/best-practices/security/.

Without an officially maintained security-best-practices page, users may deploy CubeFS in ways that are known by the community to be insecure and obviously necessary for secure but also easy to overlook. Users should not be expected to read through the entire documentation to dissect the critical parts for deployment. Instead, we recommend a dedicated page for this purpose.

The work to maintain secure-best-practices documentation should be considered an ongoing process. Adding this to the documentation, maintaining it and developing it over time is good practice.
Possible deadlocks

Severity: Moderate
Status: Fixed
Id: ADA-CUBEFS-LK432hu
Component: Multiple

Cubefs is susceptible to a number of deadlocks across multiple components. This is an umbrella issue for all identified possible deadlocks. Deadlocks happen when two threads or programs are waiting for each other to finish, where one of them does not finish. This has security implications if an attacker is able to cause the deadlock. The attacker will steer the execution of the program into a path where the program invokes a lock but does not unlock it.

Below we enumerate the places across the Cubefs source tree where this can happen.

Rate limiter
Below, Cubefs locks the mutex on line 60 and unlocks it on line 72. Between the mutex lock and unlock, the method can exit in two places: line 63 and line 67.

```go
https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/46cb4d149c45f1ad7b40381b5a2a20bd6599e25/util/ratelimit/keyratelimit.go#L58-L73

58 func (k *KeyRateLimit) Release(key string) {
59     k.mutex.Lock()
60     limit, ok := k.current[key]
61     if !ok {
62         panic("key not in map. Possible reason: Release without Acquire.")
63     }
64     limit.refCount--
65     if limit.refCount < 0 {
66         panic("internal error: refs < 0")
67     }
68     if limit.refCount == 0 {
69         delete(k.current, key)
70     }
71     k.mutex.Unlock()
72 }
```

flowctrl
A similar case to the Rate limiter exists in the flowctrl package:

```go
https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/46cb4d149c45f1ad7b40381b5a2a20bd6599e25/util/flowctrl/keycontroller.go#L55-L71

55 func (k *KeyFlowCtrl) Release(key string) {
56     k.mutex.Lock()
57     ctrl, ok := k.current[key]
58     if !ok {
59         panic("key not in map. Possible reason: Release without Acquire.")
60     }
61     } ctrl.refCount--
62     if ctrl.refCount < 0 {
63         panic("internal error: refs < 0")
64     }
65     if ctrl.refCount == 0 {
66         ctrl.c.Close() // avoid goroutine leak
67         delete(k.current, key)
68     }
69     k.mutex.Unlock()
70 }
```

Cubefs locks the mutex on line 57 and unlocks it on line 70. The method can exit on lines 60 and 64 without unlocking.
Metanodes method for marshalling a value to bytes has a potential deadlock if the call to `binary.Write` fails with an error, which will cause the method to panic without releasing the lock.

Below, `MarshalValue()` locks on line 703 and unlocks on line 719. On line 709, the method panics without releasing the lock:

```go
func (i *Inode) MarshalValue() (val []byte) {
    err := nil
    if i.multiSnap != nil {
        for _, ino := range i.multiSnap.multiVersions {
            ino.MarshalNodeValue(buff)
        }
    }
    val = buff.Bytes()
    return
}
```

An attacker who can trigger the panic in a controlled manner has the potential to exploit this by locking a lot or all resources on the machine and thereby cause denial of service.

QosCtrlManager
The Cubefs QoS manager's method for assigning QoS to clients, `assignClientsNewQos` is susceptible to a deadlock in case the manager has not enabled QoS. Below, the manager locks on line 692 and unlocks on line 722. On line 694, the manager will return if the QoS is not enabled:

```go
func (qosManager *QosCtrlManager) assignClientsNewQos(factorType uint32) {
    if !qosManager.qosEnable {
        return
    }
    serverLimit := qosManager.serverFactorLimitMap[factorType]
    var bufferAllocated uint64
    // recalculate client Assign limit and buffer
    for _, cliInfoMgr := range qosManager.cliInfoMgrMap {
        cliInfo := cliInfoMgr.Cli.FactorMap[factorType]
        assignInfo := cliInfoMgr.Assign.FactorMap[factorType]
        if cliInfo.Used+cliInfo.Need == 0 {
            assignInfo.UsedLimit = 0
            assignInfo.UsedBuffer = 0
        } else {
            assignInfo.UsedLimit = uint64((float64(cliInfo.Used+cliInfo.Need) * float64(1-serverLimit.LimitRate)))
            assignInfo.UsedBuffer = (float64(assignInfo.UsedLimit) / float64(serverLimit.Allocated)) * 0.5
        }
    }
    return
}
```
An attacker cannot control whether CUBIFS should proceed into this branch and return:

```go
if !qosManager.qosEnable {
    return
}
```

For an attacker to return on line 694 and thereby prevent CUBIFS from unlocking the manager, they would need to know that the victims CUBIFS deployment has disabled QoS and thereby cause CUBIFS to invoke `assignClientsNewQos`.

### Block cache

The Block cache manager has a method for removing item keys from the cache to free up space, `freeSpace`. This method invokes a loop that ends when a counter, `cnt`, reaches 500000. Each loop iteration performs the following steps: 1) The Block cache manager locks, 2) an item is deleted from the store, 3) the Block cache manager unlocks. This process is susceptible to a deadlock because the `freeSpace` method can exist between step 1 and 3, i.e. it is possible for `freeSpace` to lock the Block cache manager and return without unlocking it.

On line 390 the manager enters the for loop. Inside the loop, the manager locks on line 399 and unlocks on line 415. On line 403, `freeSpace` can return without unlocking the manager.

```go
func (bm *bcacheManager) freeSpace(store *DiskStore, free float32, files int64) {
    var decreaseSpace int64
    var decreaseCnt int

    if free < store.freeLimit {
        decreaseSpace = int64((float32(store.capacity)) - free) *
            (float32(store.capacity)))
    }

    if files > int64(store.limit) {
        decreaseCnt = int(files - int64(store.limit))
    }

    cnt := 0
    for {
        if decreaseCnt <= 0 && decreaseSpace <= 0 {
            break
        }

        //avoid dead loop
        if cnt > 500000 {
            break
        }
    }
```
Volume manager

When Cubefs’s Volume Manager applies an update to a volume unit, it does so with `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit`. `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit` gets the disk info with a call to the disk managers `GetDiskInfo`. If this call fails, `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit` returns the error. Before getting the disk info, `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit` puts a lock on the volume that is being modified, and `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit` will not release that lock if the call to `GetDiskInfo` fails. In other words, if the call to `GetDiskInfo` fails, the lock will not be released. The parameter to `GetDiskInfo` is passed directly from a parameter to `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit`. `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit` locks the volume on line 691 and unlocks it again on line 710. On line 701, `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit` returns without unlocking the volume.
This deadlock can be triggered in two ways. One way is to pass a parameter to `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit`, which the user knows will result in returning on line 701. The second way is to modify the disk manager such that when another user invokes `GetDiskInfo()` on line 699, it will fail. `GetDiskInfo` returns an error if the `diskInfo` of the passed `DiskID` does not exist:

https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/5ab518b3598ee99a74b333d0d2abc80739bbae4d/blobstore/clustermgr/diskmgr/diskmgr.go#L274-L285

```go
274 func (d *DiskMgr) GetDiskInfo(ctx context.Context, id proto.DiskID) (*blobnode.DiskInfo, error) {
275   diskInfo, ok := d.getDisk(id)
276   if !ok {
277     return nil, apierrors.ErrCMDiskNotFound
278   }
279
280   diskInfo.lock.RLock()
281   defer diskInfo.lock.RUnlock()
282   newDiskInfo := *(diskInfo.info)
283   // need to copy before return, or the higher level may change the disk info by the disk info pointer
284   return &(newDiskInfo), nil
285 }
```

An attacker could trigger the deadlock by removing disks that the caller of `applyAdminUpdateVolumeUnit` expects to exist.

**Blobnode**

The `PutShard` method of the `ShardsBuf` type is susceptible to a deadlock from a missing lock release in case of a wrong size comparison.

`PutShard` performs a size comparison as part of a sanity check and returns an error if the data size does not match the expected size. When doing so, `PutShard` does not unlock the `ShardsBuf`.

On line 293 below, `PutShard` locks the `ShardsBuf` and unlocks it on line 312. On line 309, `PutShard` performs the sanity check `if int64(len(shards.shards[bid].data)) != size {` and returns `errShardSizeNotMatch` on line 310 if it fails. Before returning `errShardSizeNotMatch`, `PutShard` does not unlock the `ShardsBuf`, and it remains locked after returning:

https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/46cb4d149c45f1ad7b40381b5a2a20bd6d599e25/blobstore/blobnode/work_shard_rec over.go#L292-L324

```go
293   shards.mu.Lock()
294
295   if _, ok := shards.shards[bid]; !ok {
296     shards.mu.Unlock()
297     return errBidNotFoundInBuf
298   }
299
300   if shards.shards[bid].size == 0 {
301     shards.mu.Unlock()
302     return nil
303   }
304
305   if shards.shards[bid].ok {
306     shards.mu.Unlock()
307     return errBufHasData
308   }
309
310   size := shards.shards[bid].size
311   if int64(len(shards.shards[bid].data)) != size {
312     return errShardSizeNotMatch
313   }
314   shards.mu.Unlock()
315
316   // read data from remote is slow, so optimize use of lock
317   _, err := io.ReadFull(input, shards.shards[bid].data)
318   if err != nil {
319     return err
320   }
```
shards.mu.Lock()
shards.shards[bid].ok = true
shards.mu.Unlock()
return nil
Possible nil-dereference from unmarshalling double pointer

Severity: Low
Status: Fixed
Id: ADA-CUBEFS-ASBDVGA
Component: ObjectNode

Unmarshalling into a double-pointer can result in nil-pointer dereference if the raw bytes are NULL.

CubeFS has a case that would trigger a nil-pointer dereference and crash the CubeFS ObjectNode:

```
https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/45442918591d25e7ab555469df384df468df5dbc/objectnode/acl_api.go#L186-L201
```

```
186 func getObjectACL(vol *Volume, path string, needDefault bool) (*AccessControlPolicy, error) {
187 xAttr, err := vol.GetXAttr(path, XAttrKeyOSSACL)
188 if err != nil || xAttr == nil {
189 return nil, err
190 }
191 var acp *AccessControlPolicy
192 data := xAttr.Get(XAttrKeyOSSACL)
193 if len(data) > 0 {
194 if err = json.Unmarshal(data, &acp); err != nil {
195 err = xml.Unmarshal(data, &acp)
196 }
197 } else if needDefault {
198 acp = CreateDefaultACL(vol.owner)
199 }
200 return acp, err
201 }
```

On line 194, `getObjectACL` unmarshals into a double pointer. `acp` is declared on line 191 as a pointer and is referenced with a pointer on line 194. If `data` on line 194 is the byte sequence equal to NULL, `acp` will be nil on line 194 and return nil, nil.

This behaviour will trigger a nil-pointer dereference on 145 in the below code snippet:

```
https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/6a0d5fa45a7720c752fa9e44738bf5d86c84bd/objectnode/acl_handler.go#L110-L153
```

```
1 func (o *ObjectNode) getObjectACLHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
2 var {
3 err error
4 erc *ErrorCode
5 }
6 defer func() {
7 o.errorResponse(w, r, err, erc)
8 }()
9 param := ParseRequestParam(r)
10 if param.Bucket() == "" {
11 err = InvalidBucketName
12 return
13 }
14 if param.Object() == "" {
15 err = InvalidKey
16 return
17 }
18 }
19 vol *Volume
20 if vol, err = o.GetVol(param.bucket); err != nil {
21 log.LogErrorf("getObjectACLHandler: load volume fail: requestID(%v) volume(%v) err(%v)", GetRequestID(r), param.bucket, err)
22 }
```

On line 194, `getObjectACLHandler` unmarshals into a double pointer. `acp` is declared on line 191 as a pointer and is referenced with a pointer on line 194. If `data` on line 194 is the byte sequence equal to NULL, `acp` will be nil on line 194 and return nil, nil.
On line 136, `getObjectACLHandler` invokes `getObjectACL`. If this returns `nil, nil`, then a nil-pointer dereference will be triggered on line 145.

**Mitigation**
Unmarshal into a single pointer instead of a double pointer.
Potential Slowloris attacks

Severity: Low  Status: Fixed  Id: ADA-CUBEFS-AMK23ghJVHJ  Component: AuthNode

Slowloris is a type of attack where an attacker opens a connection between their controlled machine and the victim's server. Once the attacker has opened the connection, they keep it open for as long as possible. They will do the same with a large number of controlled machines to hog the available connections and prevent other users from accessing the service. As such, the victim's server stays up but remains busy from processing the attacker's requests and becomes unavailable to legitimate users.

An attacker can exploit a Slowloris issue by identifying execution paths in their target application that cause it to take longer time to return from, and the attacker can then send requests that force the application into these. The fact that Cubefs's Master server is susceptible to a Slowloris attack does not mean that it is easily exploitable.

AuthNode

https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/9c9f0bad65fc4a90416022cdaba2d9d6be6b7c/authnode/http_server.go#L37-L44

```go
37             srv := &http.Server{
38                 Addr: colonSplit + m.port,
39                 TLSConfig: cfg,
40             }
41             if err := srv.ListenAndServeTLS("/app/server.crt", "/app/server.key");
42                 log.LogErrorf("action[startHTTPService] failed, err[%v]", err)
43             panic(err)
44         }
```

Master

The root cause of the Master server Slowloris issue is that it does not declare a timeout. On line 50 below, `startHTTPService` declares the HTTP Server with address and handler but does not declare a timeout.

https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/5ab518b3598ee99a74b333d0d2abc80739bbae4d/master/http_server.go#L37-L64

```go
37 func (m *Server) startHTTPService(modulename string, cfg *config.Config) {
38     router := mux.NewRouter().SkipClean(true)
39     m.registerAPIRoutes(router)
40     m.registerAPIMiddleware(router)
41     if m.cluster.authenticate {
42         m.registerAuthenticationMiddleware(router)
43     }
44     exporter.InitWithRouter(modulename, cfg, router, m.port)
45     addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%s", m.port)
46     if m.bindIp {
47         addr = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", m.ip, m.port)
48     }
49     var server = &http.Server{
50         Addr: addr,
51         Handler: router,
52     }
53     var serveAPI = func() {
54         if err := server.ListenAndServe(); err != nil {
55             log.LogErrorf("serveAPI: serve http server failed: err(%v)", err)
56             return
57         }
58     }
59     go serveAPI()
60 }
```
The server does not have a timeout at all because the server has specified neither `ReadTimeout` nor `ReadHeaderTimeout`. This grants an attacker ample flexibility and possibilities for getting the server to hang. Note that the server also does not have write timeouts, which adds to an attacker's possibilities of triggering this.

Below, we enumerate all other HTTP servers that do not specify timeouts. We do not include tests and examples.
Mitigation
Add timeouts when declaring the servers.
Releases are not signed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity:</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status:</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Id:</td>
<td>ADA-CUBEFS-NJb32hjJBN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component:</td>
<td>CubeFS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CubeFS releases are not signed, with keys available alongside releases. Signing releases and allowing consumers to verify them mitigates supply-chain risks.

A tool like Cosign makes the signing process easy and low-effort and keeps the overhead for consumers low to verify signatures. These signatures should be available with releases.

**Mitigation**

Release signing by way of Cosign can be adopted by way of the official Cosign Github Action: https://github.com/marketplace/actions/cosign-installer.
Security Disclosure Email Does Not Work

**Severity:** Low  
**Status:** Fixed  
**Id:** ADA-CUBEFS-vc34CGVJB  
**Component:** Security Policy

During the audit, Ada Logics attempted to disclose a finding to the email address listed in CubeFS's security disclosure guidelines: https://github.com/cubefs/cubefs/blob/master/SECURITY.md. The email bounced, and the CubeFS team did not receive the security finding.

This could prevent or discourage community members from contributing to CubeFS's security posture. We recommend regularly ensuring that communication channels for responsible security disclosures are tested.

During the security audit, the CubeFS maintainers enable disclosures through the Github interface.
Timing attack can leak user passwords

Severity: Moderate
Status: Fixed
Id: ADA-CUBEFS-Jh2iu3423b
Component: Master

Summary
CubeFS uses a string comparison for user passwords that is prone to timing attacks. A timing attack is a side-channel attack whereby an attacker observes the response time from an application and can deduce the number of matching characters in their payload against the control string.

Details
CubeFS password validation routine:

```go
func (s *UserService) validatePassword(ctx context.Context, args struct {
    UserID   string 
    Password string 
}) (*proto.UserInfo, error) {
  // Check the user info...
  // Check the access key info...

  if ak.Password != args.Password {
    log.LogWarnf("user:[%s] login pass word has err", args.UserID)
    return nil, fmt.Errorf("user or password has err")
  }

  return ui, nil
}
```

... is prone to a timing/side channel attack due to the way CubeFS compares the two passwords on this line:

```go
if ak.Password != args.Password {
  log.LogWarnf("user:[%s] login pass word has err", args.UserID)
  return nil, fmt.Errorf("user or password has err")
}
```

For similar issues in the Go ecosystem, which include technical discussions about timing attacks and mitigation, see:

- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mq6f-5xh5-hgcf
- https://github.com/gin-gonic/gin/issues/3168

Impact
This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users to escalate privileges to the level corresponding to the highest privileged user in the UserService. If there are users with root permissions being authenticated by `validatePassword`, this is the possible level of privilege escalation.

All CubeFS users using the Master `UserService validatePassword` to validate user passwords are impacted by this.